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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
Case No. 20060969-CA

vs.
GARY BROWN,
Defendant / Appellant

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing hypothetical testimony when said

evidence was irrelevant, and where any probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial
effect. This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Decorso,
1999 UT 57, \ 16, 993 P.2d 837. This issue was preserved in an oral objection made
during trial (R. 66: 142-44).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the Appellant's
Brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Gary Brown appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Honorable G. Rand Beacham after he was convicted by a jury of sexual battery, a class A
misdemeanor, and intoxication, a class C misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Gary Brown was charged by Information filed in Fifth District Court on March 6,

2006 with sexual battery, a class A misdemeanor, and intoxication, a class C
misdemeanor (R. 1-2).
On September 15, 2006 Brown filed a motion to dismiss the intoxication charge
for lack of sufficient evidence, and to exclude the testimony of the arresting officer
pursuant to Rules 401-403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 30-31).
On September 18, 2006 a jury trial was conducted and Brown was found guilty on
both charges (R. 49, 50-52). At the end of trial, Brown was sentenced to supervised
probation for 24 months and ordered to pay a fine of $750.00, and given credit for time
served in jail (R. 50-52). The written order was filed on September 25,2006 (R. 52-54).
On September 25, 2006 a notice of appeal was filed in Fifth District Court (R. 50).
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Testimony of Teresa Reynolds
On March 4, 2006 Teresa Reynolds was working at a Laundromat on Bluff Street
in Washington County owned by her family (R 66: 126-27, 134). She and her husband
had been taking turns doing the cleaning (R. 66: 134). When she arrived at the
Laundromat Gary Brown was there (R. 66: 128). She had seen him there every Saturday
(R. 66: 137). While she was cleaning the washing machines, Brown asked her about how
far along she was in her pregnancy and she replied "eight months" (R. 66: 128, 136). He
told her about having a friend who is pregnant with twins (R. 66: 128-29).
They continued to talk as she moved into the middle of the room (R. 66: 129-30).
He followed her and she testified that he "grabs my wrists and pulls me forward. And I
try to back away for a minute. And he pulls me forward" (R. 66: 130). She tried to back
away because she "felt a little nervous and I could smell he was intoxicated" (R. 128:
130). Brown objected to her characterization of intoxication and the trial court sustained
the objection (Id.). Reynolds then clarified that "He was stumbling a little bit. And you
could smell on him really bad. And his eyes looked a little glossy also. So, that's the
only thing I can say" (R. 66: 130-31). She also indicated that she could smell alcohol as
she came into the Laundromat (R. 66: 131).
After he pulled her in by the wrists Brown told her, "Mexicans make this place
really dirty, huh?" (R. 66: 131). She agreed and then anxiously started to walk into the
bathroom with her rag and garbage bag (R. 66: 132). Brown followed her in and stated,
"You are really pretty" (R. 66: 132). She thanked him and walked out of the bathroom.
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Brown tried "to pull me forward again a little bit—not pulling me forward, but whisper
something. And, at that point, I turned out. And I felt him grab my butt, so I just left"
(R. 66: 132, 138). She went outside and called her husband about what happened, and he
instructed her to call the police because she was shaken up and crying (R. 66: 133).
She called the police and her husband called his father, who was a policeman (R.
66: 133). Her father-in-law came, took a report and arrested Brown (R. 66: 133).
Initially there was another woman present but she left before Reynolds' contact
with Brown (R. 66: 134-35, 137). Reynolds was sixteen years old on the date of the
incident (R. 66: 138).
B. Testimony of Officer Shawn Carter
Shawn Carter is employed by the St. George Police Department (R. 66: 140). On
March 4, 2006 he received a dispatch to respond to the Laundromat on a complaint by
Teresa Reynolds (Id.). When he arrived, he spoke first with Reynolds (R. 66: 140). She
was upset and her eyes were red like she had been crying, and her demeanor was she was
"shaken" (R. 66: 140).
After taking her statement, he made contact with Brown (R. 66: 140).
Immediately he noticed a strong odor of alcohol on Brown (R. 66: 141). Brown also
matched the description given to him by Reynolds (Id.). In addition, to the odor of
alcohol, Carter testified that Brown had unsteady balance, walked slow, and swayed as he
stood (R. 66: 141). His eyes were also red and bloodshot (Id.). His responses to
questions were also slow and "seemed like he was trying to comprehend or understand
what I was saying" (R. 66: 151). Carter asked if he'd been drinking and Brown informed
4

him that he had "consumed a 42-ounce Tall Boy within the last hour"" (R. 66: 141). A
'Tall Boy" is basically a big can of beer (R. 66: 144). Brown also told him he'd had a
conversation with "a pregnant white female'* that lasted about "a minute" (R. 66: 177).
Brown "emphatically" denied touching Reynolds' butt at all (R. 66: 178).
Carter did not perform field sobriety tests on Brown (R. 66: 141, 144-45). Carter
didn't believe that other tests were necessary because Brown was "so intoxicated [that]
he needed to immediately be handcuffed for his safety and for mine" (R. 66: 153).
However, Carter testified that in the past when he'd given intoxilyzer tests to
individuals with the characteristics he'd seen in Brown, they tested positive for alcohol
consumption "every time" (R. 66: 142, 144). Brown objected to this testimony as being
irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative: "The State is trying to show that the
officer has experienced in this type of investigation that he's seen these clues before and
has confirmed that type of thing as a strong indicator of intoxication as has been shown
by confirmation as he's done so" (R. 66: 143). The trial court allowed the testimony and
stated, "I'm not sure how relevant it is, though, to the particular charge against this
particular person. It may give some background for the officer's opinion, however. And
so, so long as it's done to suggest the officer's background and experience, I would allow
him to give that as part of an expert opinion. If it's to suggest that anything directly
measurement-wise toward Mr. Brown, of course, that would be inappropriate" (R. 66:
143).
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Carter arrested Brown and transported him to Purgatory Correctional Facility (R.
66: 145). At the jail they have an intoxilyzer machine that was available for Carter to
use, but he did not administer the test to Brown (R. 66: 145-46).
C. Motion for Directed Verdict
Brown moved for a directed verdict of dismissal of both charges for lack of
sufficient evidence (R. 66: 154). He argued that "some evidence other than the opinion
of an officer who had at his disposal [other tests such as an intoxilyzer]. We are in this
case to allow him to testify to that, allowing him to make a legal conclusion and factual
conclusion without any independent evidence for the jury to consider, we would ask that
the court apply that standard [found in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a part 5 dealing with
driving under the influence], which is the only standard in the code giving us a definition
of those things to this as a definition of being under the influence of alcohol and argue
that the evidentiary burden has not been met and that count two should be dismissed55 (R.
66: 154-55).
The trial court denied the motion finding that the observations of the officer and
witness are facts for "the jury to weigh to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to
determine whether they understand those facts to establish the elements of the offense55
(R. 66: 157).
D. Testimony of Gary Brown
Gary Brown admitted to being in the Laundromat on the day in question (R. 66:
161). He had been there before and had run into Reynolds on occasion (R. 66: 162). He
testified that was sitting in a chair (R. 66: 162). While there he had a conversation with a
6

lad) who was taking clothes out of a dry er and folding them on a table (R. 66: 163-64).
While he was sitting Reynolds walked in and began cleaning (R. 66: 164). Brown
doesn't "really remember" speaking to her "other than just a nod hello or kind of
recognizing who she was, because she was walking around cleaning up" (R. 66: 164). He
was doing a word search (R. 66: 164-65). He made small talk, "kind of hi, and how's it
going, kind of thing" with Reynolds (R. 66: 168).
Brown denied intentionally touching Reynolds in the way she described (R. 66:
165). He denied grabbing her butt intentionally or accidentally (R. 66: 165). He testified
that he "didn't get that close to her to be able to do that" (R. 66: 165). He was "just
sitting there in the chair until my mom came by" to bring him laundry and lunch (R. 66:
165, 162). He didn't know that Reynolds had been outside and was confused when the
officers "barged" into the Laundromat and told him he was under arrest for "pinch[ing] a
woman on the rump" and "public intox" (R. 66: 166, 171-72, 74). When the officers
came in the room he stood (R. 66: 167).
Brown remembers there were security cameras in the Laundromat and that you
can see yourself on the screen when you walk around (R. 66: 166). He believes that the
camera would have picked up where he was in the Laundromat (R. 66: 167).
Brown testified that to his knowledge Tall Boy's are 22 ounces and not 42 ounces
(R. 66: it>8j. He indit ated that lie ihu'sii i drink beer because it "doesn't agree" villi hum,
and he denied being intoxicated when the police came to arrest him (R. 66: 1685 173). He
told the officer he had consumed alcohol the previous night but denied drinking that day
(R. 66: 173-74).
7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Brown asserts that the trial court erred in allowing testimony that was irrelevant,
and whose probative value—if any—was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred In Allowing Evidence that was Irrelevant, and
whose Probative Value—if any—was Substantially Outweighed by its
Prejudicial Effect

Brown was convicted of sexual battery, a class A misdemeanor, and public intoxication, a
class C misdemeanor. Teresa Reynolds testified that Brown had grabbed her by the wrist
and pulled her to him, and that subsequently he grabbed her butt (R. 66: 130, 132, 138).
She also testified that he was stumbling slightly, smelled of alcohol, and had glossy eyes
(R. 66: 130-31). Brown admitted to drinking the previous night but denied being
intoxicated at the time (R. 66: 173-74). He also denied intentionally or accidentally
grabbing Reynolds' butt, or to touching her in the way she described (R. 66: 165).
Officer Shawn Carter, the arresting officer, testified that he noticed a strong odor
of alcohol on Brown, that Brown had unsteady balance, walked slow, and swayed as he
stood, and that his eyes were also red and bloodshot (R: 66: 141). Carter also testified
that Brown's responses to questions were also slow and "seemed like he was trying to
comprehend or understand what I was saying" (R. 66: 151). Carter asked if he'd been
drinking and Brown informed him that he had consumed a Tall Boy within the last hour
8

(R. 66: 141). Carter did not perform field sobriety tests on Brown (R. 66: 141. 144-45).
Carter didn't believe that other tests were necessary because Brown was "so intoxicated
[that] he needed to immediately be handcuffed for his safety7 and for mine" (R. 66: 153).
Carter also did not administer an intoxilyzer test to Brown at the jail although a machine
was available (R. 66: 145-46).
During his testimony the State asked, "Have you ever done any type of intoxilyzer
tests on other individuals when you have seen these characteristics?" (R. 66: 142). Carter
replied, "Yes" (Id.). The State then asked, "When you have done that, what have the
results of those intoxilyzers been?" (Id.).
Brown objected to this question under rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (R. 66: 142). Namely that such testimony is irrelevant, and alternatively that
any probative value is outweighed by its potential for prejudice: "The State is trying to
show that the officer has experienced in this type of investigation that he's seen these
clues before and has confirmed that type of thing as a strong indicator of intoxication as
has been shown by confirmation as he's done so" (R. 66: 143).
The trial court allowed the testimony and stated, "I'm not sure how relevant it is,
though, to the particular charge against this particular person. It may give some
background for the officer's opinion, however. And so, so long as it's done to suggest
the officer's background and experience, I would allow him to give that as part of an
expert opinion. If it's to suggest that anything directly measurement-wise toward Mr.
Brown, of course, that would be inappropriate" (R. 66: 143).
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Carter then answered the question and testified that in the past when he'd given
intoxilyzer tests to individuals with the characteristics he'd seen in Brown, they tested
positive for alcohol consumption "every time" (R. 66: 142, 144).
Brown asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the officer to
render an expert opinion that every time in the past when he'd administered intoxilyzer
tests to individuals with the characteristics he's seen in Brown they had tested positive for
alcohol consumption. Brown asserts that this testimony was improper for two
fundamental reasons:
One, evidence that other people with similar characteristics had tested positive for
alcohol consumption is irrelevant. Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines
relevant evidence as: "[E]vidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." The fact that other people who had red eyes,
poor balance, an odor of alcohol, and were slow to respond to questions were found to be
intoxicated or had consumed alcohol does not make it any more or less probable that
Brown was intoxicated at the time in question. There are a myriad of reasons including
exhaustion, allergies or illness, crying that a person may have red or bloodshot eyes.
Similarly there are a myriad of reasons other than alcohol intoxication why an individual
may have poor balance or slow response times to questions. Moreover, the fact that the
officer smelled an odor of alcohol on Brown does not necessarily equate to intoxication
as an individual can consume alcohol or be around alcohol without necessarily being
intoxicated. Unless the evidence "tends to prove some fact material to the crime
10

charged" it is irrelevant. Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at ^ 22 (emphasis in original) (Under
Rule 402 other crimes evidence is irrelevant and should be excluded unless it tends to
prove some fact that is material to the crime charged other than the defendant's
propensity to commit crime).
In State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177, the defense sought to admit
testimony from an officer as to whether he had knowledge of people pulling guns on
officers in an attempt to commit suicide. The trial court excluded the evidence on the
basis that it was too remote to the case and therefore irrelevant. 2000 UT 8 at f 25. The
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion because whether the officer had
knowledge of "officer-assisted suicide" is unot relevant to the defendant's state of mind
at the time of the offense... [and] does not shed light on the defendant's intent or state of
mind at the time of the offense. Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at Tf 28. In this case the fact that in
the past others have tested positive for alcohol consumption does not shed light on
whether Brown was intoxicated. Accordingly, because it has no probative value as to any
material fact, it is irrelevant; and the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the
officer.
Two, even if Officer Carter's testimony has any relevance to a material fact, its
probative value is far outweighei I h the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury...."
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In this case, the trial court acknowledged that the testimony had little if any
relevance "to the particular charge against this particular person" (R. 66: 143). The trial
court also acknowledge that it would be improper "to suggest that anything directly
measurement-wise toward Mr. Brown" (R. 66: 143). However, that is precisely what
happened. The jury was essentially told that Brown must have been intoxicated because
"every time" in the past Carter had tested similarly situated individuals, they had tested
positive for alcohol consumption.
"To ascertain the probative value of proffered evidence, the trial court... must
necessarily measure the strength of the evidence and its ability to make the existence of
the evidence of a consequential fact either more or less probable." State v. Williams, 173
P.2d 1368, 1371 (Utah 1989). As argued above, Carter's testimony as to the intoxilyzer
test results of other individuals has little, if any, probative value as to whether Brown was
intoxicated.
Moreover, the trial court acknowledged that any suggestion that the testimony
implicated anything directly towards Brown would be improper. However, the question
and answer itself connected Brown with these unnamed individuals who had been given
intoxilyzer tests. The question was whether Carter had performed objective tests as to
alcohol consumption on individuals who had the same characteristics as Brown and
whether they tested positive for alcohol consumption, and the answer was "every time."
Brown's testimony was that he had not consumed alcohol since the previous night
but that he had slept at a friend's house and was unkept. Reynolds testimony was that he
was stumbling slightly, smelled of alcohol and had glossy eyes. Carter's personal
12

observations were similar to Re\ nolds. In addition. Carter testified that Brown admitted
to drinking a Tall Boy an hour previous while Brown denied drinking beer or a Tall Boy.
None of the testimony against Brown had the objective effect of the jury hearing that
ever}7 individual displaying characteristics observed in Brown had tested positive on an
intoxilyzer test. Carter could have given Brown a test. A machine was available at the
jail for that purpose. He chose not to administer the test to Brown. The question to
Carter by the State was nothing more than an attempt to correct that deficiency by
bringing in hypothetical third persons into the equation.
This testimony, allowed by the trial court over the objection of Brown, was not
relevant, and its probative value—if any—was substantially outweighed by the prejudice
suffered by Brown as a result. Instead of the jury judging the credibility of Brown's
statements versus those by Carter and Reynolds, this testimony created an inference in
the minds of the jurors that an objective test of alcohol consumption/intoxication had
been made in this case because if "every time" intoxilyzer tests were administered to
others with similar characteristics they tested positive, then Brown, too, must have had
the same result. Moreover, this testimony mislead the jury, and confused the jury, into
believing that the issue was not whether Brown was intoxicated, but whether he would
test positive for alcohol consumption. "Intoxication" is not clearly defined in the Utah
Code, and testing positive for alcohol consumption does not necessarily equate to
intoxication.
Accordingly, Brown asserts that the trial court erred in admitting testimony by
Carter concerning unnamed third parties' results on intoxilyzer tests because said
13

evidence was irrelevant, and any probative value was substantially outweighed by
prejudice to Brown, and that it needless mislead and confused the jury.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Brown asks that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the matter to Fifth
District Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of November, 2007.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to Brock Belnap, Washington County Attorney, 178 North 200 East,
St. George, Utah 84770 on the 15th day of November, 2007.
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l T-VH RULES O r E \ IDENC E

655

Rule 401

Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and
proceedings.
In en ll actions and pi oceedingb the effect of a pi e^umption i espectmg a fact
which is an element of a claim oi defense as to which fedeial lav supplier the
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law
Achisoiy C o m m i t t e e Note — The t e \ t of
this lule l taken iiom Rule _>02 Unifoui Rules
of E idencc 19 4 Presumption in cnmin il

cases aie not treated in this mle See Utah
Code Annetatcd Section 6 1 o0o 19o 01 m\
aubbPquent e\ibion of th it section

ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY
AND ITS LIMITS
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
'Rele\ant e\idence means e\idence h a \ m g anv tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable 01 less probable than it would be without the evidence
Advisory C o m m i t t e e N o t e — Thi^ rule > =
the fedei al i ule \ erbatim and l comparable in
substance to Rule 1(2) "Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971 but the formei mle defined i e l e \ a n t
evidence a^ that ha\ 1112: <* tendenc\ to pro\ e or

disprove the existence of am matenal fact
\\01dmg; the use of the teim matenal r act
accord^ vith the application gi\en to formei
Rule 1(2 bv the Utah Supreme Court State \
Peterson 06O P2d 133" Utah 19""

NOTES TO D E n S K )NS
Burden of proof
Demonstrate e p\idence
—Photo gi aphb
Disco\ ei ^
Effect of lemoteness
Relationship to rime charged
Rele\ cinee
Victims testimony on defense theoiy
Cited
Burden of proof
The defendant failed to meet his burden to
lay the necessar\ two part foundation of rele
vance to admit evidence of the witness s health
history offered for the puipose of attacking the
witness s credibility because he did not show
that the witness s mental health disoider 1m
Paired the witness s ability to accuiateh per
ceive recall md 1 elate events nor did defen
dant offer e\idence that the disabiht} was
c
°ntempoianeous with the witness •* obser\a
toons 01 testimom State \ Stewart 925 P2d
5
98 U t a h C t App 1996)
In a prosecution lor 1 ape it was not error to
delude testimony of defendant s expert on Jap
anese cultural values since its onh rele\ance
w
as to the ci edibility of the victim not anv
dements of the crime and defendant did not
ia
y a proper foundation for its admission State
v
Finlajson 956 P 2 d 283 (Utah Ct App 1998)
demonstrative e v i d e n c e
~~-Photographs
In a murder trial six color photographs of the
v
ictim lying on the ground were relevant as
tn
ey corresponded to the testimony of wit
Besses Vv hose credibility was m question State

\ CaUiham 2002 UT b " :T P3d 220
Discovery
Defendant stipulation that she would tot
use a \ehicle \aluation comparison at t u a l
remo\ ed an> need plaintiff might ha\ e had for
information useful to impeach that document
The information sought was thereroie irrele
vant and undiscov erable Mijor \ Hills 1999
U T 4 4 980 P2d 683
Effect of r e m o t e n e s s .
Remoteness usualh goes to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility Terry \
Zions Coop Mercantile Inst 605 P2d 314
(Utah 1979) overruled on other grounds Mc
FarlancU Skaggs Cos Inc 6^8 P 2d 298 Utah
1984)
R e l a t i o n s h i p to crime charged
Evidence of nicknames chants and dances
by defendant and his friends which was not
remote in either time or place and provided
background for the rape charged was idmissi
ble State v Bovd 2001 UT 30 25 P3d 935
Relevance
In a piosecution of defendant on foui counts
of aggravated sexual abuse of a child the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a
police detectives testimony that defendant
made inquiries about a deal in context de
fendant s inquiries were relevant to defendant s
denial of the allegations of sexual abuse and his
consciousness of the allegations substance
State v Smedley 2003 UT App 79 469 Utah
Ad\ Rep 41 6 7 P 3 d 1005
In action challenging public status of a road
adjacent to plaintiffs property the relevance of

Rule 402

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

right-of-way agreements between the owners
and two oil companies, proffered to show that
use of the road was permissive, was not demonstrated because the agreements appeared
only to give the oil companies a right to come
upon the property to maintain a pipe, while
other uses of the road had been established.
Chapman v. Uintah County, 2003 UT App 383,
486 Utah Adv. Rep 45, 81 P.3d 761, cert
denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004).
Victim's t e s t i m o n y o n d e f e n s e theory.
In a prosecution for attempted aggravated
murder arising from an incident in which the
defendant, while a passenger in an automobile,
thrust a gun at a police officer after the vehicle
was stopped for a traffic violation, the court
properly excluded testimony as to whether the
officer had ever heard of people pulling guns on
police officers in an attempt to commit suicide,
as any such knowledge by the police officer was
not relevant to the defendant's state of mind at

the time of the incident and
was allowed to present his
assisted suicide" by other
Colwell, 2000 UT 8,~994 R2d

656
as the defendant
theory of "officer
means State v
177

Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah
1986); Meyers v Salt Lake City Corp , 747 P.2d
1058 (Utah Ct App 1988); Fisher ex rel Fisher
v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App 1988)Belden v Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 (Utah Ct'
App. 1988); State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839
(Utah 1988); State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981
(Utah 1989); State, In re R.D.S., 777 P.2d 532
(Utah Ct App 1989) Whitehead v American
Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990)'
State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 (Utah Ct. App'
1991); State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct
App. 1992); State v 633 E. 640 N., 942 P.2d 925
(Utah 1997), State v Nelson-Waggoner, 2000
UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78.
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific
Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah
L. Rev. 839.
A.L.R. — Admissibility of evidence of ab-

sence of other accidents or injuries at place
where injury or damage occurred, 10 A.L.R.5th
371.
Admissibility of evidence in homicide case
that victim was threatened by one other than
defendant, 11 A.L.R.5th 831.

Rule 402, Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note. — The text of
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except t h a t prior to the word
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United
States" have been added.

Compiler's Notes. — The Utah rule also
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Discretion of court.
Effect of remoteness.
Harmless error.
Irrelevant evidence.
Other crimes.
Probability evidence.
Relevance.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Cited.
Discretion of court.
The trial court is given considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
While relevant evidence is generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is relevant,
and the appellate court will find error in a

relevancy ruling only if the trial court has
abused its discretion. State v. Harrison, 805
P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991).
In a personal injury action, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence
of plaintiff's prior injuries because they were
relevant to the issues of causation and damages. Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prods., Inc., 939
P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Effect of r e m o t e n e s s .
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P2d 314
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 R2d 298 (Utah
1984).
Harmless error.
Even if the admission of testimony regarding
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UT App 244 9 P 3 d 769 Campbell v State
Farm Mut Auto Ins Co 2001 UT 89 432
Utah \d\ Rep 44 65 P3d 1134 re\ d on othei
grounds, 538 U S 408 123 S Ct 1513 155 L
Ed 2d 585 (2003) State v Bradley 2002 UT

658

App 348 57 P 3 d 1139, State \ Holbert 2002
UT App 364 58 P 3d 877 State \ Houskeeper
2002 UT 118 462 Utah Ad\ Rep 24 62 P3d
444

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w R e v i e w . — United States t
Downing
Novel Scientific Evidence and the
Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L Re\ 839
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA
Testing Utah Standards for Admissibility, 1988
U t a h L Re\ 717
The M> sterious Creation of Search and Sei
zure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitu
tions The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L Re\
751
Note Utah Rule of Evidence 403 and Grue
some Photographs Is a Picture Worth Anything
in Utah?, 1996 Utah L Rev 1131
A.L.R. —Admissibility of voice stress evalu
ation test results or of statements made during
test, 47 A L R 4th 1202
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior
misidentification of accused in connection w ith
commission of crime similar to that presently
charged, 50 A L R 4th 1049
Products liability admissibility of evidence of
absence of other accidents, 51 A L R 4th 1186
Thermographic tests admissibility of test

results m personal injur} suits 56 A L R 4th
1105
Criminal law dog scent discrimination line
ups, 63 A L R 4 t h 143
Products liability admissibility of experi
mental or test evidence to disprove defect m
motor vehicle 64 A L R 4th 125
Admissibility, m criminal cases of evidence
of electrophoresis
of dried
evidentiary
bloodstains, 66 A L R 4th 588
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex related
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal
fluids, 75 A L R 4th 897
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or en
hanced testimony, 77 A L R 4th 927
Admissibility of DNA identification evidence,
84ALR4th313
Admissibility in evidence of composite pic
ture or sketch produced by police to identify
offender, 23 A L R 5th 672
Admissibility of results of presumptive tests
indicating presence of blood on object 82
A L R 5th 67

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except t h a t "surprise" is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence The
change m language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of
"unfair prejudice" as contamed m Rule 403 See
also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule
403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of

dealmg with "surprise " See also Smith v Estelle, 445 F Supp 647 (N D Tex 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital
case ruled prejudicial and violation of due process) See the following Utah cases to the same
effect Terry v Zions Coop Mercantile I n s t , 605
P 2 d 314 (Utah 1979), State v Johns, 615 P2d
1260 (Utah 1980), Reiser v Lohner, 641 P2d 93
(Utah 1982)
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a)
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Childhood sexual experiences
Child witness
Circumstantial evidence
Confusion of issues
Credibility of witness
Cumulative evidence
Determination of admissibility
Disability benefits
Expert testimony
Extent of damages

Film of murder scene
Guilty plea
Harmful error
Harmless error
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Inflammatory evidence
Offensive remarks
Other offenses
—Specificity
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